How concentrated are global infrastructure markets? by Benitez, Daniel & Estache, Antonio
 










World Bank and  






In infrastructure, the possibility of a positive relationship between operators’ profitability and the degree of 
concentration is a major political issue in view of the wide diversity of feelings about the potential role of the 
private sector. This is particularly important in view of (i) the large residual degree of monopolies, (ii) the 
protection they are granted through exclusivity clauses built in service delivery contracts and (iii) the widespread 
sense that the same operators tend to be present in most of the privatized operations. The main purpose of this 
paper is to provide a first set of quantitative assessments of the degree of concentration in infrastructure at the 
global and at the regional level. Concentration issues were identified in only about 20% of the cases studied, a 
presumption of concentration was found in another 30% of the cases. We find no correlation between the degree 
of concentration and the degree of reform adopted by a region or a sector. In more general terms, we find no 
scope for simple encompassing regional or sectoral statements because issues are region- and sector-specific. We 
conclude by arguing that there are a few cases and regions in which it would make sense for a supranational 
competition or regulation agency to ensure that the interests of the users are protected more effectively against 
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The promotion of competition in the delivery of infrastructure services was to be one 
of the main expected contributions of the reforms of the 1990s throughout the world. 
Depending on the sector, roughly 40% (water) to 70% (telecoms) of the developing and 
transition countries introduced some major institutional reform to ease competition in or for 
the market.
1 This search for competition resulted in major structural changes in infrastructure 
in many countries. Unbundling of the various segments of each sub-sector was the expected 
norm of many reforms. For instance, in electricity, generation, transmission and distribution, 
operations became separate business units in many countries and in telecoms, fixed and 
mobile started to be handled as commercially distinct activities. These changes were all 
intended to increase the number of actors in infrastructure service delivery.  
Because of economies of scale and scope and, in many developing countries because 
of the high commercial risks faced by private operators, limits to the achievable degree of 
competition in the market continued to prevail in some cases. In small countries, monopolies 
are indeed hard to avoid in water and energy distribution and in bigger countries, national 
monopolies are replaced by regional or local monopolies, but monopolies nonetheless. This is 
why  competition for the market has become so popular during the 1990s. Residual 
monopolies were auctioned --rather than awarded through beauty contests or negotiations--
because auction theory promised to deliver many of the gains that competition in the market 
would have delivered.  
One of the assumptions implicit in this promise was that the number of potential 
providers in the sector would be large enough to allow competition for the market to be 
effective. This did not happen for all sectors. In Latin America, during the 1990s, 92% of the 
water and sanitation auctions, 76% of the transport auctions and 57% of the energy auctions 
awarded had 3 or fewer bidders (Estache (2003)). The only sector with many bidders was the 
telecoms sector. For some sectors, the anecdotal evidence suggests that competition was 
limited simply because the number of actors was limited. The most extreme is the water 
sector. Estache and Trujillo (2004) report that between 1990 and 1997 out of the 58 large 
water and sewerage projects signed in developing countries, over 50% were awarded to the 
                                                 
1 Estache and Goicoechea (2004)   2
same firm and 40% to two others. In most infrastructure sectors, the limitation of the 
competition also reflects the fact that many of the players tend to hedge by investing as 
members of consortia rather than as individual providers. This is quite relevant, not only to 
the assessment of the degree of competition but also from the viewpoint of the assessment of 
the sectors’ concentration. It also means that the estimation of the extent of concentration does 
indeed require a knowledge of the composition of the ownership of each large operator—and 
ideally, its change over time.   
Why should we care? Because in infrastructure the possibility of a positive 
relationship between operators’ profitability and the degree of concentration is a major 
political issue--in view of the wide diversity of views on the potential role of the private 
sector. The concern about a negative relationship between the profitability of privatized 
infrastructure services delivered by monopolies and social performance underpins the theory 
of regulation today. This concern is reinforced by the fact that the products covered here tend 
to be  homogeneous (water, electricity, telecoms) and that reform processes often reinforced 
the residual monopolies by protecting them with exclusivity clauses. This is why the reforms 
in so many cases had to include the creation of an independent regulatory agency. 
Unfortunately, local regulators do not enjoy supranational evidence on what could make the 
service they are auctioning not competitive. Nor do they have a mandate to assess it. 
The general common wisdom is that the more concentrated the market, the more the 
behavior of that market‘s operators will be harmful to social well-being because they will try 
to raise prices to obtain higher profits.
2 Moreover, given the decreasing nature of the demand 
function, a policy of high prices restricts supply, a major issue in any country or region in 
which one of the main expected outcomes of reform is to speed up connection and access 
rates—besides the economic opportunity cost associated with the lower supply. 
3 
In addition to these traditional concerns, the modern theory of industrial organization 
suggests that even in the absence of a single dominant firm in a region, competition in the 
sector could also be threatened in situations of tacit collusion in market structures similar to 
                                                 
2 This view is known as the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. It has dominated industrial organization for about 50 
years before being questioned by a vision of the field which tends to prefer the study of strategic behavior on a case by case 
over the search for broad regularities. See Pepall, Richards and Norman (2002), for instance for a good textbook discussion.  
3 Several objections can be made to the common wisdom of a negative relationship between concentration and well-being. 
Most relevant here may be that demand may increase with quality, and if a large company is likely to offer better quality of 
service than smaller ones (regularity of service for example), a higher price does not necessarily mean a restriction of the 
quantity sold.   3
those prevailing in the regional or global infrastructure markets. In other words, there is a risk 
that operators delivering services in the same sector across countries could engage in 
coordination with outcomes in terms of prices or quantities, equivalent to those prevailing 
under a cartel.
4  
With this background in mind, the main purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we 
provide quantitative indicators on the residual degree of concentration in each sub sector after 
a decade of reforms across sectors and across regions. We cover electricity generation and 
distribution, fixed and mobile telephony, water and sanitation. Second, we discuss the extent 
to which there may be a case for more coordination between country specific agencies or even 
a case for a supra-national agency to address any concern for excessive concentration in a 
sector.  
To conduct the assessment, we built the database from scratch from the partial 
information available on the web, mostly from international agencies specialized in some 
sectors (i.e. International Energy Agency, Water and Sanitation Program of the World Bank 
or the International Telecommunication Union) and from specialized consulting and credit 
rating firms. Because the database does not cover the full supply spectrum, we also had to 
approximate the concentration indices typically used by competition agencies. The 
approximation provides a range for the market power rather than the point estimate typically 
relied on by competition authorities to take decisions. Accordingly, we propose an adjusted 
associated rule to assess market power. The results seem however to be robust enough to 
identify the sector and regions in which a case for a supranational competition authority or 
coordinated regulation could be made. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used 
to approximate the degree of concentration in each market and each region of the world. 







                                                 
4 See for instance Pepall, Richards and Norman (2002) , pp349-405   4
2. The  methodology 
 
To assess the extent to which global infrastructure markets are concentrated and enjoy 
market power at the regional or global level, information is needed on the number of firms 
active in the market, their relative size in that market and their ownership structure. The 
section first sorts out the conceptual issues associated with the characterization of the relevant 
firms, owners and definition of a market. Next, it discusses the practical challenges associated 
with the quantification of market power and the solutions adopted in this paper.  
2.1 Some conceptual background 
From the perspective of competition policy, the first issue to address is the 
characterization of the firms, in particular in terms of their size. It should ideally be measured 
by the annual flow of sales in the relevant market or, if the products are homogeneous, by the 
quantities sold (since the price is the same for all firms) or also by the physical capacity of the 
operators. In practice, the appropriate data is not always available and it is sometime easier to 
approximate the size by the populations covered by the providers.  
The second challenge is the definition of the relevant market. Under modern 
competition law, it is defined along two dimensions: the product and the geographical 
dimensions. The objective is to identify the market in which firms can limit competition of the 
industry under review. The reference market of an industry thus is the set of products and 
points of sale from which demand cannot escape a specific operator and hence one in which 
this operator could impose a “small but significant and non-transitory increase” in price—as 
defined in the US legislation for instance.  
The geographical reference market consists of the area in which the firms concerned 
are involved in the supply of products or services with little or no competition. By design, in 
most countries, the perceived reference market tends to be a local or national monopoly. This 
is why the local lack of competition in infrastructure services at the local or national level is 
typically handled by an independent regulatory capacity in most reforming countries. 
What happens when a single operator or a small set of operators controls de facto 
regional or global markets? This is not an issue expected to be addressed by the local 
regulators. However, it does raise a public policy concern since users have much less choice 
when an auction cannot guarantee an efficient outcome. This is the case when a collusive   5
behavior reduces competition at the regional level, even if it is unnoticed at the local level. In 
this case, it could be argued that the relevant market for infrastructure services with at least 
some degree of restriction to competition across countries is a supranational regional market 
(e.g. Latin America, Africa or Asia). In some instances, when the sector is controlled by a 
limited number of specialized firms and there is a concern for world wide collusion, the 
relevant market may actually be the global market. 
 
2.2 Towards a specific measure of global or regional market power 
The main measure of market power relies on simple statistical observations, 
essentially market shares, and combines them into concentration indices from which risks of 
abuse are assessed. This section describes the approach followed here to assess regional and 
global concentration level after a brief reminder on the mechanics of the main indices used in 
practice--assuming for now that the issue of defining the relevant market has been settled.
5 
If  i q  is the production of firm i and n the number of firms active in the relevant 
market—national or supranational—, the market share of i is measured by: 
. 
 
The minimum market share of a firm in the relevant market is higher than 0% and the 
maximum is 100%, that is  1   0 ≤ < i s .In the context of this paper, the shares are defined in 
terms of the share of ownership in a specific license or concession contract, rather tan in terms 
of the incorporated operators  to which the contract was awarded. In other words, if an 
contract is owned in equal proportions by two operators, each operator i only gets credited 
with 50% of ownership in the in the calculation of  its si... 
In practice, many firms publish their activities per country and the share in their total 
business as part of their annual report. Based on that information,  if a firm share is α-percent 
in a specific contract in a specific country, we compute the α-percent of the MWs installed, 
customers covered or lines depending on the industry considered. In other words, if a contract 
is owned in equal proportions by two operators, each operator i only gets credited with 50% 
                                                 












of ownership in the in the calculation of  its si... This approach means that we control for 
ownership, independently of whether the firm in the sample has the control or not. Assuming 
full ownership (100%) may leads to an overestimation when more than one firm in the sample 
holds shares of the same provider i.e. in Argentina, Ondeo and Veolia have shares in Aguas 
Argentinas. See the appendix for a more detailed explanation. 
Knowing the shares () n s , , s , s K 2 1 , the challenge is to construct an index that can 
provide information about regional or global market concentration simply and rapidly. There 
are essentially two groups of indices meeting that challenge: composite (or global) or partial 
indices. 
The most familiar member of the global indices is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), defined by 
 
For each exogenous value of the number of active firms n, this index varies between a 
minimum of 
n
4 10  when all firms are equal ( i s = 
n
1 ) and a maximum of 
4 10  when there is one 
very large firm (nearly monopolistic) with  1 − n  very small competitors.
6 Markets with an HHI 
under 1000 are considered “not concentrated” and generally do not require further analysis. 
Market in which  1800 HHI 1000 < <  are “moderately concentrated” and competition is 
thought threatened if the merger causes the HHI to increase by more than 100 points. Finally, 
if the HHI exceeds 1800, the market is highly concentrated and any transaction that causes an 
increase of  50 HHI > ∆  calls for further inquiry. 




=  when the n firms are of the same size, the reciprocal value 
HHI
4 10  is a good indicator 
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 = 5 firms define a 
highly concentrated market. 
                                                 
6 The index is discussed in the United States’s Merger Guidelines as a possible filtering system to determine whether a 
planned merger should be cause for concern (Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger 
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  While this indicator is relatively easy to deal with in national markets, it is somewhat 
more complex to generate for supranational markets. None of the infrastructure sectors has an 
exhaustive database on operators or their activities around the world, including their share of 
ownership in various contracts. The big players are generally well known but they only 
represent a sub-set of the total number of actors. In that case, an alternative is to rely on a 
partial index which informs the competition agency with less than the desirable information 
set. A common such index is the sum of the market shares held by the k largest firms (with 








= ∑  with  n k k s s s s s > > > > > > + K K 1 2 1 . 
For example, CR4 measures the market share of the four largest firms. Such partial indices 
have a number of drawbacks. They provide very little information about differences between 
markets with a small number of firms.
7  
The main advantage of this partial index is its simplicity and its ease of interpretation. 
In addition, it can be used in an approximation of the relevant HHI. Indeed, Sleuwaegen and 
Dehandschutter (1986) have shown the existence of a non-linear relation between HHI and 
CRm. In spite of a number of limitations, this results makes it easier to come up with a 
decision criteria in industries for which information is not available on all operators.  
The approximation basically gives an upper and lower band for the HHI 
corresponding to a given CR :  
 
This approximation has two problems.
8 The first is that the relationship between HHI 
and CR is weaker the more concentrated the market is. Indeed, the spread between HHmin and 
HHmax increases with the concentration ratio. This problem can thus only be assessed ex-post 
                                                 
7 A second drawback is that, if mergers or acquisitions occur among firms not included among the four largest, and if those 
operations do not change the ranking of the top four firms, the C4 index does not signal any change. This is more relevant 
when assessing the evolution of concentration than when taking a single snapshot.  

















once the concentration rate has been assessed. If it turns out that a few companies have a 
fairly high market share, the approximation is likely to be weak. The second is that it does not 
lead to the simple decision rule equivalent to the rule adopted by the US Department of 
Justice.  
We suggest the following adaptation which could serve to any analyst interested in 
assessing supranational concentration rates: 
(i)  if both HHmin and HHmax are below 1000, there is no concentration problem; 
(ii)  if both HHmin and HHmax are over 1800, there is a clear case of concentration; 
(iii) if  HHmax is above 1800 and HHmin between 1000 and 1800, the test is inconclusive but 
there are good reasons to be concerned with market power from concentration so the 
rule should read as inclusive but presumption that “yes there is concentration”  
(iv) if  HHmax is between 1000 and 1800 and HHmin  below 1000, then the test is 
inconclusive but the presumption is that “no there is no concentration”. 
(v) if  HHmax is above 1800 and HHmin below 1000, then the test is really inconclusive. 
9 
 
3.  The sector specific assumptions and results 
This section briefly discusses the basic data and presents the results of the computation 
of the various maximum and minimum HHI indices. Most of the data is from 2003, unless 
otherwise specified. For every sector, we summarize the information. We report the market 
indicator selected, the minimum and maximum HHI computed, the number of operators 
covered by the indicator and their aggregate market share, the number of countries as well as 
the total number of contract or “cases” included in the database. The concentration index is 
computed for the main regional markets of the world as well as for the global market. Table 1 
summarizes the information collected.  
 
                                                 
9 Note that a large discrepancy between the lower and upper bound is not necessarily a signal of concentration.    9
Table 1: Overview of the data available 
 
First it shows that we tried to report data on the sectors as unbundled as possible. 
Second, for the electricity and telecommunications, we managed to get market data close 
enough to what a competition agency would consider appropriate. For water and sanitation, 
we relied on two proxies: urban population and total population. The first probably gives a 
lower bound and the second an upper bound of the populations affected by the large operators 
covered by the database. We should thus get respectively a further level of upper and lower 
bound for the concentration index from these two measures. Third, the country coverage is 
relatively evenly distributed between OECD and non-OECD countries which ensures a 
reasonable sense of robustness when comparing the two country groups. Finally, the 
combination of the market shares and of the number of players suggests that there is no 
outrageous domination of any sector by a very limited number of actors and hence that the 
approximation method used here is unlikely to be very distorted at the global level.  
At a more substantive level, a simple look at the line on the number of players 
suggests that for electricity and telecoms, the concentration issue is subject to debates since 
the number of firms is large enough according to the rule of thumb discussed earlier. For 
water and sanitation, the information on the number of firms already points to a fairly high 
concentration level. The rest of this section refines this first superficial assessment. 
3.1 Electricity   
For electricity, we differentiate between the two main activities: generation and 
distribution—i.e. local transmission and retailing; we did not find enough information on 
Electricity Water  &  Sanitation  Telecommunication
Sector 
Generation Distribution  Water  Sanitation Fixed  Mobile 
Product Definition  Installed capacity 
(MWs) 
Number of customers 
(connections) 
1.  Urban population covered (*) 
2.  Country population (**) 
Number of working 
lines 
Number of Players*  16 firms  12 firms  7 firms  7 firms  9 firms  9 firms 
Number of Countries in sample                   
OECD  19 12  23 20  18  25 
No OECD  38 19  33 18  17  40 
Total  57 31  56 38  35  65 
Market Shares:*                   
World  18%   31%  23%(**) - 34%(*)   23%(**) - 31%(*)   39%  37% 
 * The market share represents the average of the sample market but only in countries in which the firms of the sample have an activity. The 
standard deviations are given for regional and country measures.   10
transmission. Generation tends to be competitive at the national level while distribution is not. 
We select a set of the main international actors according to the numbers of countries where 
these firms have activity but also with respect to the numbers of own MW installed for 
generation and customers covered for distribution. This choice is partially based on the 
information available from the Annual reports of the International Energy Agency and on 
information provided by credit rating agencies in their regular reports and information most 
commonly available on the web site of the main actors of the sector. In most of the cases, the 
database source for each firm is its own webpage. 
Note that in generation we rely on installed capacity instead of on production to 
compute the HHI for two reasons. First, it captures the potential effect of concentration since 
a firm can produce up to capacity.
10 Second, many firms do not publish production in their 
public reports and the sample size would have been much smaller. 
 
a.  Electricity Generation 
For generation, we consider a set of 16 firms present in 57countries (19 OECD and 38 
non OECD) and credited with 16% of the global market. The set of firms is composed of: 
American Electric Power (AEP), AES Corporation, CLP Group, Duke Energy, E.ON, 
Electricité de France (EDF), Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), ENDESA, ENTERGY, Union 
Fenosa (UF), Hong Kong Electric Group (HEG), Intergen, Public Service Enterprise Group 
(PSEG), Reliant Energy Inc., Southern Energy Company and Tractabel Power.
11  
At the global level, Table 2 generally confirms the expectations, although with a 
couple of surprises. Indeed, Table 2 shows that, as expected, this is not an overly concentrated 
market at least globally. In other words, generation is a competitive sector in general--
although EDF and E.ON have a significantly larger market share than the others, their lead is 




                                                 
10 Note however that capacity can be considered as a different product in energy market 
11 E.on has subsidiaries LG&E and Powergen. Intergen is a group formed from equal participation of Shell and 
Bechtel. Tractabel Power belongs to the Suez Group. 
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Table 2: Regional HHI for Electricity Generation (2003) 










Market indicator   Installed Capacity per country (MW) 
HH min  734  592 594  1762 20  48 1386 
HH max  1630  1527 1261  3467  206  416  2893 
Aggregate market 
share 
18%  16%  15% 47% 10%  8% 40% 
Number of firms  16  5 10 10  9  7 12 
Number of 
countries 
57  6 14 15  2  8 12 
Cases  157  7 29 60 12  13  36 
Main actors  AEP, AES, CLP, 

















































At the regional level, a strict adherence to the rule suggested above would however 
only clear North America and Eastern Europe of any market power. Both Latin America and 
Western Europe should be sources of concern for an hypothetical supranational competition 
agency as indicated by the HHIs and hinted at by the large market shares of the operators 
present in the regions. For Western Europe, this is not a surprise since the liberalization of the 
sector has not yet fully been implemented. For Latin America, this comes as a major surprise. 
Indeed, Latin America is the region in which the largest number of countries have some 
significant reform levels in the sector. In over half of the countries of the region, the private 
sector now has a significant role in generation. Yet Table 2 suggests that even the lower 
bound of the HHI is close to what would justify a pro-active role for a supranational 
competition agency concerned with the degree of concentration in the sector.  
 
b.  Electricity Distribution 
For distribution, we have data on 12 firms present in 31 countries (12 OECD and 19 
non OECD). They account for 31% of the global electricity distribution market. We only have 
data on one of the two countries for North America and hence we do not deal with it at the 
regional level since the methodology would produce a country specific indicator. The sample 
size for some of the regions (Africa and Asia) is also rather small—to a large extent because 
of the few deals with private operators in this activity in both regions--and hence the results 
are likely to be biased and of lesser interest. The companies included are: American Electric 
Power, AES Corporation, CLP Group, E.ON, Electricité de France (EDF), Electricidade de   12
Portugal (EDP), ENDESA, ENTERGY, Union Fenosa, Hong Kong Electric Group (HEG), 
Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) and Southern Energy Company. 
 
Table 3: Regional HHI for Electricity Distribution 










Market indicator   Number of customers per country 
HH min  1498  663 1075 1433  -  2316 2000 
HH max  2933  1618  2654 3169  -  3769 3455 
Aggregate market 
share 
31%  16%  33% 41% 12%  38% 43% 
Number of firms  12  2  3 6 5  3 5 
Number of countries  31  3 3 11 1 6  7 
Cases  51  3 4 20 5 6 13 
Main actors  AEP, AES, CLP,  E.ON, 
EDF, EDP, ENDESA, 




















ENDESA,  UF 
 
 
The decision rule proposed suggests that globally this sector is probably subject to a 
market power problem. EDF, Endesa and E.ON seem to be strong leaders at the global level 
with respectively 38.1%, 15.2% and 14.8% served by the 12 top operators of the business. 
Even if HH min does not reach the 1800 threshold, it is high enough to raise some concern. 
This impression is strongly enhanced by the HH max which is well above the threshold and 
this for a fairly large sample size. All of Europe is clearly a concern since in both Eastern and 
Western Europe, all of the HH are above the 1800 threshold. As mentioned earlier, the 
liberalization of the sector has not yet gone very far. In Eastern Europe, the issue is that few 
countries have actually privatized their distribution and E.ON enjoys a significant share of the 
market by itself. Latin America and Asia & Oceania are both inconclusive but are in the range 
in which it may make sense to take a closer look at the situation. For Latin America, this is 
once more somewhat surprising. For all of its reforms, the dominating presence of Endesa, 




The market indicator is the number of lines in working conditions controlled by an 
operator and the information is collected from the 2003 annual report of each firm. We 
consider fixed and mobile technologies separately.
12 For each sub sector, we consider the 10 
                                                 
12 Even if an obvious question in the “real world” would be to consider that the extent to which a product market that 
combines fixed and mobile should not also be considered since most of the top firms are the same in the two markets.    13
first firms identified in a 1999 ITU report in a ranking of the main 20 providers according to 
their turnover. It turns out that 8 of these firms are present in both the fixed and the mobile 
lines business. For fixed lines, the 9 top firms were then: Bell South Corporation, BT Group, 
Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, SBC, Telecom Italia, Telefonica de España, Telstra, and 
Verizon. For mobile, the firms covered are: Bell South Corporation, Deutsche Telekom, 
France Telecom, SBC, Telecom Italia, Telefonica de España, Telstra, Verizon and Vodafone. 
BT is dropped from the mobile list while Vodaphone is not present in the fixed line list. For 
fixed lines we consider 35 countries (18 OECD and 17 non OECD) while for mobile, we 
cover 65 countries (20 OECD and 45 non OECD).  
A few words of caution on this list may be appropriate. First, there is a fair amount of 
turnover in ownership in this sector. Some of the firms in the 1999 list have now changed 
owners (and names). Our choice of operators is thus arbitrarily frozen in 1999 even if the 
information is collected for these companies in their form as of 2003. Second, there is a clear 
regional specialization of firms. There are only 4 firms with a strong presence in LDCs: 
France Telecom, SBC, Telecom Italia, Telefonica de España. This last one is particularly 
dominating in Latin America, Telstra in Asia and France Telecoms in Eastern Europe. Third, 
the list does not do justice to the growing presence of regional actors in the various regional 
markets with strong South African firms present in Africa and strong Mexican and Brazilian 
operators present in Latin America for instance. However, most of these firms and many of 
those included in the ITU list do not publish the necessary information on their webpages and 
hence we cannot make a fair assessment of their effective role in diluting or reinforcing 
market power in this sector. However, many of these firms are often at least partially owned 
and controlled by one of the top 12 through cross-ownership arrangements. Overall, the firms 
covered here are present in 67 countries through 127 operators. 
a. Telecoms  Fixed 
With the market performance indicator adopted here and based on the 35 countries in 
which the top 9 operators are present, Table 4 shows that the global concentration level is 
quite high. These operators controlled 39% of the market in 2003 and have both the HH min 
and HH max above the 1800 threshold level. This very high levels of concentration generally 
reported is not that surprising. In many countries, fixed telephony is still a monopoly. What is 
more surprising is to see the low ratio of firms to country across regions. Only Africa and   14
North America would enjoy the benefit of the doubt under the decisions rule adopted here to 
decide the existence of a concentration problem. Latin America and Europe—both east and 
west—are once again the two regions in which the concentration levels are the highest. 
Eastern Europe and Asia are not that far behind. 
While the concentration indicators are useful, once more, they do not tell the full story. 
First, it may be useful to point out that in 2003, Deutsche Telekom and SBC shared 40% of 
the market controlled by these 9 companies in the world. Second, actors relatively small at the 
global level can be very important are the regional level. This is the case of Telstra who is big 
in Asia but relatively small globally. Finally, however strong the presence of these firms may 
be in developing areas, for most of them the core business continues to be in developed 
countries, most importantly in Western Europe and North America. 
Table 4: Regional HHI for Telecoms – Fixed 










Market indicator   Number of working lines per country 
HH min  2009  888 2265  2859  524  2075  3443 
HH max  3551  2342 4169  3929  1796  4499  4570 
Aggregate market share  39%  23% 42%  46%  30%  45%  48% 
Number of firms  9  2 2  4  3  2  6 
Number of countries  35  6 4  9  2  3  11 
Cases  42  6 4  12  4  4  12 
Main actors  Bell South, BT, 
Deutsche Telekom, 
France Telecom, 
SBC, Telecom Italia, 





























b.  Mobile Telecoms  
Globally, based on our sample of 65 countries in which the top 9 operators are present, 
the measure proposed here suggests that it is difficult to make an assessment of the degree of 
market power in the sector. The HH max is fairly high but the HH min is below the 1000 
threshold level which makes the indicator inconclusive. The fact that 9 firms cater to 37% of 
the market seems to suggest a relatively large number of actors. But this does not tell the full 
story. Indeed, in 2003 Vodaphone controls 33% of the number of working lines credited to 
these 9 companies. Telefonica de España, SBC and Verizon added up to a further 40% of that 
total. This suggests that at the global level, 4 actors are particularly important. 
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Table 5 Regional HHI for Telecoms – Mobile 










Market indicator   Number of working lines per country 
HH min  994  1113  655 1507 464 1000 1222 
HH max  2778  2748 1838 3576  2521 2584  3402 
Aggregate market share  37%  31% 22% 48%  36% 38%  50% 
Number of firms  9  4 6 7  5 6  7 
Number of countries  65  10 13 16  2  9  15 
Cases  125  12  14  36 6 19 38 































































Although the test are inconclusive at the regional level, in the case of Africa, Latin 
America and the two European Regions, the fact that the HH min is above the 1000 threshold 
suggests that a presumption of concentration could be argued by an hypothetical supranational 
competition agency. For North America and Asia & Oceania, the presumption would go the 
other way around.  
To get a fuller sense of the situation, it is useful to point out that like in the fixed line 
business, there is a regional specialization of the main actors. In 2003, Deutsche Telekom and 
Vodaphone were the major actors in Western Europe who together controlled 35% of that 
regional market for the 9 leading companies of the world. They were followed at a distance by 
France Telecoms and Telefonica de España who add up to about 10% of that market. 
Deutsche Telekom and Vodaphone were also very strong in North America, Eastern Europe, 
Asia & Oceania. The developing world market is largely dominated by France Telecoms, 
Telefonica de España, Telecom Italia, SBC, Verizon and Vodaphone. These companies do 
seem to have regional specialization. Telefonica de España is, as in the case of fixed lines, the 
main player in Latin America but with a strong presence of Telecom Italia, SBC and Verizon. 
France Telecom is a leader in Eastern Europe (with Deutsche Telekom) and in Africa (with 
Vodaphone). 
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3.3 Water and Sanitation 
We consider the seven most important private firms that provided water and sanitation 
around the world in 2003. These companies are present in at least 61 countries. The set is 
made by: Ondeo, Veolia, RWE, Saur, United Utilities (UUT), Anglian Waters (AWG) and 
Severn Trent (SET).
13 The information is provided by each firm in its annual report (2003) 
available from the web site of these companies or from the national stock market commission 
for listed companies. We also relied on information collected from the web site of the Public 
Services International Research Unit and by a 2003 report on the sector by Lehman 
Brothers.
14 
The total information available is, per country and firm, the population coverage by 
water service and sewerage. In addition, there is a set of 19 more private firms present in these 
62 countries. Typically, these are spin-offs of local construction companies. The water 
business is increasingly popular indeed in the construction sector in developing countries. 
Most of the Brazilian market for instance is catered to by Brazilian construction firms. The 
global information is however limited and we can only determine how many of these firms 
there are per country as well as the share of the total population they cover. We call this set as 
“Other Private Providers” (OPP).
15 They represent about one third of the global market and 
their share in regional markets varies from less than 15% in Eastern Europe to almost 60% in 
Latin America where all the local construction companies have become such big players in 
many countries that they control the largest market of the region (i.e. Brazil). Hall et al. 
(2004) for instance document the role of many Asian companies in Asia, alone or in 
partnerships with OECD companies (Veolia, Ondeo/Suez and Thames). From Hong Kong, 
Citic Pacific, NWS Holding, China Everbright and China Water are all active in the Chinese 
market. In Malaysia, Pucak Niaga, Ranhill Utilities and Taliworks Corp are three of the larger 
water and sanitation companies in the country. Other Malaysian companies such as Pilecon, 
PPB/Keery Utilities, PBA Holdings Berhad and Salcom are mostly active in China.  
                                                 
13 Bechtel is probably the only major actor missing from this list but we did not have enough information to 
include it. 
14 Missing from the report are the British Biwater and the Dutch Ne-on who often team up as consortia during 
the 1990s in particular in East Asia.  
15 The information available on OPPs includes urban and country population covered by these OPPs in each country together 
with the number of these firms per country. Therefore, it is not possible to compute the market share of each OPP. However, 
to compute the CRm, this information is not required since the aggregate market share and the number of the OPPs per 
country is enough.   17
In our assessment of the concentration rates, we distinguish between water and 
sanitation. In water, we cover 56 countries (23 OECD and 33 non OECD) and in sanitation 38 
countries (20 OECD and 18 non OECD). The market is defined in two ways. The first focuses 
on the share of urban population covered and serves as an upper bound for the degree of 
concentration. The second is the share of total population in each country and serves as a 
lower bound. The first may be a good approximation of the appropriate market in developing 
countries since large private firms tend to specialize in urban water systems. It may not be the 
right proxy for developed economies where full coverage has been achieved.  
a. Water 
Somewhat surprisingly given the large publicity given to the high degree of 
concentration of this market, the indicators for both urban and total population are 
inconclusive. The presumption from the HH generated by the urban indicator is however that 
concentration leaning towards strong at the global and regional level. In contrast, the 
presumption is not confirmed by the larger market definition since the HH max for the 
country population is below 1800—although border line.  
Table 6: Regional HHI - Water 










Market indicator   1. Urban population (upper bound concentration) 
2. Country population (lower bound concentration) 
HH min(urban)  1 163  2 990  353  585  1 598  809  643 
HH max (urban)  2 857  4 514  2 174  1 874  3 467  2 580  2 536 
HH min (country)  514  648 120  263 1  290  423  339 
HH max (country)  1 694  2 043  763  1 291  2 777  1 586  1 702 
Aggregate market share 
(urban) 
34%  49% 25%  28%  40% 31%  31% 
Aggregate market share 
(country) 
23%  23% 14%  21%  35% 22%  24% 
Number of firms  7  4 6  5  5 5  7 
Number of OPP  19  7 7 16 10 8  16 
Number of countries   56  13 8  12  3  7  13 
Cases  151  18 29  35  14 12  43 












































At the regional level, Africa is the only region where there is a clear concentration 
problem in terms of the urban population even if this is not confirmed by the indicator on the 
country population. The main actors are the three large French companies with the local   18
private sector. The strong concentration is not surprising however in view of the marginal role 
played by large foreign operators in the rural parts of the country and in view of the fairly low 
level of coverage of network water suppliers in general in the region.  
North America is the other region in which there may be some scope for concern. This 
region is in fact the only one in which the two indicators tell a consistency story. Note that it 
is important to remember that this data does not reflect the acceleration of the concentration 
process in this sector. As reported by D. Hall (2002), a series of recent takeovers of US 
companies by French companies is fueling this process. Suez bought US Water, which was 
owned by Bechtel and United Utilities, and also a number of Azurix contracts in Mexico. 
RWE-Thames have bought private water operations in the USA from Anglian Water.  
For all of the other regions, there is no conclusive evidence of a major concentration 
problem based on either indicator. This is largely due to one of the most interesting story 
emerging in this sector. Indeed, in many countries, there is good evidence of a surprising large 
role of the local private water companies. Their role is the strongest in Latin America where 
they cater to the needs of roughly 58% of the population, followed closely by a share of 54% 
of North America’s population. In Africa, Asia, Western Europe and Eastern Europe, they 
represent respectively 29%, 27% , 21% and 13% of the market. These figures help in keeping 
the HH indices low. They do not however reflect the fact that in Africa or Asia for instance, 
the main role of these local operators is to deliver the service where the large foreign private 
sector is not interested in view of the commercial risks they would face and the public sector 
has never been, or is no longer, able to deliver the services.  
In terms of the overall market share of the various companies—defined in terms of the 
countries’ population--, there is clear domination of the two large French companies, Ondeo 
and Veolia. When non global providers (OPPs) are taken into account, they control 43% of 
the market--when regional and national private players are ignored, they control two-thirds of 
the market. The next to large players are RWE and Saur with respectively 7.6% and 6.9% of 
the global market. The are the dominating actors in every regions except North America and 
Western Europe.  
 
 
   19
b. Sanitation 
In the sanitation sector, there is no clear case of concentration neither at the global 
level nor at the regional level. Although Ondeo and Veolia clearly dominate the market and 
are followed closely by the large German group RWE, there are other private operators 
(OPP). These OPP include many local players in many of the countries and serve about a third 
of the population of the world.  
North America, is, once more, a clear border line under both types of market 
definition, suggesting that its sanitation market may be subject to some degree of market 
power by the few operators who dominate the market. The indicator is however formally 
inclusive. Eastern and Western Europe are also border cases when relying on the urban 
population indicator to define the market.  
The developing regions of the world are much less concentrated than sometimes argued. 
This is largely due to the fact that coverage rates are fairly low. In many countries of the 
developing world, sanitation is a much less formal activity than in the developed part of the 
world.  
 
Table 7: Regional HHI - Sanitation 










Market indicator   1. Urban population (upper bound concentration) 
2. Country population (lower bound concentration) 
HH min(urban)  782  231  457  260  1 738  1 016  989 
HH max (urban)  2 246  951  1 063  1 466  3 504  3 072  3 416 
HH min (country)  476  51 156  171  1  407  536  534 
HH max (country)  1 542  452  565  1 095  2 837  1 914  2 391 
Aggregate market share (urban)  31%  19% 21% 25% 45%  35%  40% 
Aggregate market share (country)  23%  13% 11% 20% 40%  24%  31% 
Number of firms  7  2 1  12  5  5  7 
Number of OPP  19  7 0 0 7  13  13 
Number of countries  37  6 5 8 2  5  11 
Cases  102  9 15  27  12  2  37 
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4. Policy  implications 
 
 
In spite of the limitations stemming from the assumptions we had to make as a result 
of the poor quality of the information available and accounting for the very risk averse 
evaluation rule, this quantitative exercise provides a number of useful policy hints. Table 8 
summarizes the information for each country grouping. 
The first obvious conclusion is that there are very few certainties in general and no clear 
world wide sectoral pattern. There is no scope for simple encompassing regional or sectoral 
statements because issues are region- and sector-specific. The second is that at the Global 
level, the presumptions of concentration problems only arise for the businesses which use to 
be the main motivation to maintain these services in the public sector: electricity and water 
distribution as well as fixed phones services. Third, Western Europe is the region with the 
largest number of actual or potential concentration problems—it is in trouble in electricity and 
probably in telecoms as well. Eastern Europe follows closely with as many sectoral 
potentially problematic. North America, Africa and Asia & Oceania have the fewest number 
of problematic sectors. Fourth, Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America and North 
America are the only regions with sector wide potential concentration problems. They are also 
among the most developed in the world—this list only exclude Oceania. This is somewhat 
surprising since these are also the regions in theory most committed to competition. Both 
telecoms business—fixed and mobile--have actual or potential problems in these regions 
sectors. Electricity—generation and distribution--is equivalently problematic in Western 
Europe and Latin America. Water and sanitation are an actual and a potential problem in 
North America. Fifth, the telecoms sector is overall the sector with the largest number of 
potential or actual concentration problems which is also a surprise in view of the widespread 
sense that the technological revolution made the sector competitive sooner and faster than any 
other sector. It may be less surprising considering the widespread difficulties in ensuring the 
design and enforcement of fair access rules in a business in which interconnection is at the 
core of everything. Sixth, from the viewpoint of one of the poorest regions of the world, it is 
unfortunate to see that one of the most concentrated sectors is the water sector in Africa in 
spite of the potential strong role of alternative operators in the region.
16  
 
                                                 




Table 8: Concentration Problems Diagnostic 
  Electricity Telecoms  Water & Sanitation 
  Generation  Distribution Fixed  Mobile Water  Sanitation 


































Latin America  Yes Inconclusive 
towards Yes 





























5. Concluding  comments 
 
The paper has argued that since concentration in infrastructure markets can be 
associated situations resulting from anti-competitive behavior managed at the supranational 
level—collusion, predation, etc., it makes sense however to get a sense of the risks involved. 
The main focus of the research has been on the assessment the actual degree of concentration 
rather than on specific evidence of anticompetitive behavior. The paper has provided evidence 
of the complexity of the market structure of the main infrastructure services. Not a single 
sector is problematic across the board, implying that region specific conditions are the main 
determinants of the market structure observed in each region rather than the world or region 
wide supply side of the market alone.
17  
Although clear concentration issues were identified in only about 20% of the cases 
studied, a presumption of concentration was found in another 30% of the cases. Many of these 
perceived cases could be more problematic than suggested by the approximation adopted 
here. This is because the method largely ignored some important features of the sector which 
would reinforce the perception of concentration and of risks of collusion. Indeed, cross-
ownership is increasingly common in this sector and generally underestimated by analysts.
18 
                                                 
17 The ideal would have been to try to track down the evolution of concentration since the reform but the data 
was simply not available.  
18 An exception is Campos and Vegas (2003) for the impact in Spain.   22
The approach followed here does not do full justice to the consequences of this practice 
either. The fact that we have not been able to model this feature suggests that our assessment 
is a lower bound of the degree of concentration.  
A second reason why this approach may be underestimating concentration is that it 
does not deal with many of the restrictions to entry (and exit) associated with the contractual 
arrangements characteristic of this sector.  Indeed, there is not only a risk of collective 
dominance of the various actors as a result of the relatively narrow market structure, there is 
also the fact that by design many of the sectors are protected from competition by long term 
contracts signed with governments.  
It is important to also recognize that the evidence on concentration provided here is 
not evidence of misbehavior. It would indeed be important to complement this paper with an 
explicit assessment of the association of concentration with negative performance outcomes 
since the linkage between the two is not automatic. Similarly, it would be desirable to track 
the evolution of concentration over time to monitor the direction of the evolution. The 
snapshot provided here does not say if things are improving or deteriorating. 
 For those cases in which concentration could be linked to undesirable outcomes, the 
main issue will be to develop a cross-border institutional solution which has the leverage and 
mandate to address issues national regulators are neither capable nor mandated to do. There is 
a growing literature on the options available to organize a supranational agency and this 
papers contributes empirical evidence on the policy relevance of this literature. Most of that 
literature however focuses on cross-border mergers and hardly addresses the issues of 
relevance to this sector and its many unusual idiosyncrasies.  
This paper is clearly a first quantitative look at the issues. The definition of product 
markets assessed here was somewhat arbitrary. In view of the fact that the main actors are the 
same in mobile and fixed telephony or in water and in sanitation, it makes sense to also 
consider more encompassing product markets. But this is not the only direction to be 
considered. Indeed, in view of the cream skimming observed  in many regions, there is some 
concern that different operators specialize in urban and rural service delivery. This implies 
that an additional line of empirical assessment would have to unbundle the sectors into these 
two types of product markets instead.   
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Appendix 
The main purpose is to control for ownership at the supranational level rather than for 
the traditional focus on market power at the national level. To do so, independently of 
whether a firm, Fi,  in the sample has the control or not, we start with the share of each firm i 
over the local providers, LPj of each country. To see this more clearly, consider countries a 
and b in which there are two local providers denoted by LP1 and LP2. The following table 
shows per country and local provider, the amount of certain variables i.e. MWs, customers, 
lines, urban or country population.  
  Local Provider  Market 
 LP1  LP2  Total 
Country a  10 20 30
Country b  15 5 20
 
Suppose that in the sample there are two firms denoted by F1 and F2.  They have the 
following shares in each local provider: 
  F1´s shares (%) F2´s shares (%) 
  LP1 LP2 LP1 LP2 
Country a  30% 25% 60% 50% 
Country b  40% 20% 20% 60% 
 
In this case, they own (weighted by the share) the following units: 
  F1  F2 
  LP1 LP2 LP1 LP2 
Country a  356 1 0  
Country b  6133  
 
And the concentration index is computed as: 
  s1 s 2 CRm HHmin HHmax
Country a  0.27  0.53 0.80 3 200 6 400
Country b  0.35  0.30 0.65 2 113 4 225
Region      2  656 5  313
 
Formally, let´s denote by xij the amount of, for instance, MWs, customers or lines hold 
in country i by some local firm j. Let´s consider one firm of the sample, to say, firm l. If firm l 
has ,
l








= ∑  units in country i where R(i,j) is a relation between firms and countries. The   24








= ∑  and the m seller concentration ratio 







= ∑  where m represent the set of firms l that have activity in country 
i and G(i,l) is a relation between firms l and countries i. Using this value, we compute HHmin 
and HHmax per country. Regional and Global concentration index are just the country average 
concentration index.  
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